"Do not you think that if I were about any king, proposing good
laws to him, and endeavoring to root out all the cursed seeds of
evil that I found in him, I should either be turned out of his
court or at least be laughed at for my pains? For instance, what
could it signify if I were about the King of France, and were
called into his Cabinet Council, where several wise men, in his
hearing, were proposing many expedients, as by what arts and
practices Milan may be kept, and Naples, that had so oft slipped
out of their hands, recovered; how the Venetians, and after them
the rest of Italy, may be subdued; and then how Flanders, Brabant,
and all Burgundy, and some other kingdoms which he has swallowed
already in his designs, may be added to his empire. One proposes a
league with the Venetians, to be kept as long as he finds his
account in it, and that he ought to communicate councils with
them, and give them some share of the spoil, till his success
makes him need or fear them less, and then it will be easily taken
out of their hands. Another proposes the hiring the Germans, and
the securing the Switzers by pensions. Another proposes the
gaining the Emperor by money, which is omnipotent with him.
Another proposes a peace with the King of Arragon, and, in order
to cement it, the yielding up the King of Navarre's pretensions.
Another thinks the Prince of Castile is to be wrought on, by the
hope of an alliance; and that some of his courtiers are to be
gained to the French faction by pensions. The hardest point of all
is what to do with England: a treaty of peace is to be set on
foot, and if their alliance is not to be depended on, yet it is to
be made as firm as possible; and they are to be called friends,
but suspected as enemies: therefore the Scots are to be kept in
readiness, to be let loose upon England on every occasion: and
some banished nobleman is to be supported underhand (for by the
league it cannot be done avowedly) who has a pretension to the
crown, by which means that suspected prince may be kept in awe.

"Now when things are in so great a fermentation, and so many
gallant men are joining councils, how to carry on the war, if so
mean a man as I should stand up, and wish them to change all their
councils, to let Italy alone, and stay at home, since the Kingdom
of France was indeed greater than could be well governed by one
man; that therefore he ought not to think of adding others to it:
and if after this, I should propose to them the resolutions of the
Achorians, a people that lie on the southeast of Utopia, who long
ago engaged in war, in order to add to the dominions of their
prince another kingdom, to which he had some pretensions by an
ancient alliance. This they conquered, but found that the trouble
of keeping it was equal to that by which it was gained; that the
conquered people were always either in rebellion or exposed to
foreign invasions, while they were obliged to be incessantly at
war, either for or against them, and consequently could never
disband their army; that in the meantime they were oppressed with
taxes, their money went out of the kingdom, their blood was spilt
for the glory of their King, without procuring the least advantage
to the people, who received not the smallest benefit from it even
in time of peace; and that their manners being corrupted by a long
war, robbery and murders everywhere abounded, and their laws fell
into contempt; while their King, distracted with the care of two
kingdoms, was the less able to apply his mind to the interests of
either.

"When they saw this, and that there would be no end to these
evils, they by joint councils made an humble address to their
King, desiring him to choose which of the two kingdoms he had the
greatest mind to keep, since he could not hold both; for they were
too great a people to be governed by a divided king, since no man
would willingly have a groom that should be in common between him
and another. Upon which the good prince was forced to quit his new
kingdom to one of his friends (who was not long after dethroned),
and to be contented with his old one. To this I would add that
after all those warlike attempts, the vast confusions, and the
consumption both of treasure and of people that must follow them;
perhaps upon some misfortune, they might be forced to throw up all
at last; therefore it seemed much more eligible that the King
should improve his ancient kingdom all he could, and make it
flourish as much as possible; that he should love his people, and
be beloved of them; that he should live among them, govern them
gently, and let other kingdoms alone, since that which had fallen
to his share was big enough, if not too big for him. Pray how do
you think would such a speech as this be heard?"

"I confess," said I, "I think not very well."

"But what," said he, "if I should sort with another kind of
ministers, whose chief contrivances and consultations were, by
what art the prince's treasures might be increased. Where one
proposes raising the value of specie when the King's debts are
large, and lowering it when his revenues were to come in, that so
he might both pay much with a little, and in a little receive a
great deal: another proposes a pretence of a war, that money might
be raised in order to carry it on, and that a peace be concluded
as soon as that was done; and this with such appearances of
religion as might work on the people, and make them impute it to
the piety of their prince, and to his tenderness for the lives of
his subjects. A third offers some old musty laws, that have been
antiquated by a long disuse; and which, as they had been forgotten
by all the subjects, so they had been also broken by them; and
proposes the levying the penalties of these laws, that as it would
bring in a vast treasure, so there might be a very good pretence
for it, since it would look like the executing a law, and the
doing of justice. A fourth proposes the prohibiting of many things
under severe penalties, especially such as were against the
interest of the people, and then the dispensing with these
prohibitions upon great compositions, to those who might find
their advantage in breaking them. This would serve two ends, both
of them acceptable to many; for as those whose avarice led them to
transgress would be severely fined, so the selling licenses dear
would look as if a prince were tender of his people, and would not
easily, or at low rates, dispense with anything that might be
against the public good.

"Another proposes that the judges must be made sure, that they may
declare always in favor of the prerogative, that they must be
often sent for to court, that the King may hear them argue those
points in which he is concerned; since how unjust soever any of
his pretensions may be, yet still some one or other of them,
either out of contradiction to others or the pride of singularity
or to make their court, would find out some pretence or other to
give the King a fair color to carry the point: for if the judges
but differ in opinion, the clearest thing in the world is made by
that means disputable, and truth being once brought in question,
the King may then take advantage to expound the law for his own
profit; while the judges that stand out will be brought over,
either out of fear or modesty; and they being thus gained, all of
them may be sent to the bench to give sentence boldly, as the King
would have it; for fair pretences will never be wanting when
sentence is to be given in the prince's favor. It will either be
said that equity lies on his side, or some words in the law will
be found sounding that way, or some forced sense will be put on
them; and when all other things fail, the King's undoubted
prerogative will be pretended, as that which is above all law; and
to which a religious judge ought to have a special regard.

"Thus all consent to that maxim of Crassus, that a prince cannot
have treasure enough, since he must maintain his armies out of it:
that a king, even though he would, can do nothing unjustly; that
all property is in him, not excepting the very persons of his
subjects: and that no man has any other property, but that which
the King out of his goodness thinks fit to leave him. And they
think it is the prince's interest, that there be as little of this
left as may be, as if it were his advantage that his people should
have neither riches nor liberty; since these things make them less
easy and less willing to submit to a cruel and unjust government;
whereas necessity and poverty blunt them, make them patient, beat
them down, and break that height of spirit, that might otherwise
dispose them to rebel. Now what if after all these propositions
were made, I should rise up and assert, that such councils were
both unbecoming a king, and mischievous to him: and that not only
his honor but his safety consisted more in his people's wealth,
than in his own; if I should show that they choose a king for
their own sake, and not for his; that by his care and endeavors
they may be both easy and safe; and that therefore a prince ought
to take more care of his people's happiness than of his own, as a
shepherd is to take more care of his flock than of himself.